
24.11.08
President Medvedev Gives The Americans Some Food For Thought.
President Dmitri Medvedev's speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington couldn't fail to surprise the American establishment. The audience saw a completely different Russian president - not the same one who delivered his first annual address to parliament on the day after the US presidential election, with a foreign policy section that many saw as anti- American. In Washington, Medvedev delivered an overtly pro- American speech; moreover, many of its points essentially overrode the basic arguments of Vladimir Putin's famous Munich speech. But why?
Not only did Medvedev acknowledge his deepest respect for the USA - not only did he call America an ultra-influential state - but he even paid an unexpected compliment to President George W. Bush, saying that the Bush Administration has done a great deal to lay the foundations of present-day Russian-American relations.
Medvedev totally abandoned the usual Russian allegations that the USA is to blame for the global economic crisis. He also said that the crisis has some positive sides: for example, it offers an opportunity to establish a new global financial architecture.
Essentially, Medvedev completely renounced the already-famous argument about Russia having privileged interest zones in other countries: one of the five basic principles in the foreign policy doctrine he announced in mid-2008. The whole world perceived this argument as Moscow's declaration of intent to establish its own influence zone. It was immediately obvious that this would become a pretext for conflict in relations with Washington, which refuses to recognize the concept of "influence zones" as such. But now Medvedev has explained that he didn't mean creating an exclusive zone of Russia's interests; he meant Russia's "prevailing interest" in a number of states, among which he unexpectedly included a significant part of Europe and "perhaps" the USA. In other words, he instantly removed a major landmine in bilateral relations; one that he himself had laid.
The thesis that the major problem in Russian-American relations is a "crisis of trust" was the first sign that Moscow is moving back to recognizing political realities, rather than its stubborn passive-aggressive stance toward the USA. Medvedev said that there is no anti-Americanism in Russia, only difficulties in understanding each other. He even acknowledged the need to create a principally different foundation in order to make Russian- American relations a true partnership. A possible move away from Putin's Munich speech, toward realism, was also indicated by the statement that Medvedev's ideas about a new European security architecture don't entail replacing existing institutions, such as NATO; and it turns out that Moscow wants to develop partnership with NATO, including discussing the possibility of Russia itself joining NATO. This "moderate optimism," as Medvedev himself described the situation in Russian-US relations, has provided food for thought and doubts among many members of Washington's elite.
Some said immediately that what we saw was just the export version of the Russian president - especially since his CFR speech received very modest media coverage in Russia. Many in the US elite say this is an old Soviet tradition: statements made abroad are different from statements intended for Russian consumers of political rhetoric. So Medvedev's words shouldn't be taken seriously; and Barack Obama did the right thing by declining a hasty meeting with Medvedev.
Another part of the American establishment concluded that Russia has finally started realizing the extent and depth of the economic crisis, along with its own inability to counter the crisis effectively without some drastic improvements in relations with the world's largest economy. Russia, they say, is really starting to hurt as a result of slipping down the list of Washington's foreign policy priorities, due to its stance on many issues of importance to the USA and the West. Medvedev is desperately trying to boost his country's rating among the American elite, which holds the controlling interest in countering the crisis. Good relations between Russia and the USA are much more important for Russia than they are for the USA; and the further oil prices fall, the more conciliatory Moscow's policy will become.
And others suggest that Medvedev is still adrift in search of his presidential self: influenced by the foreign policy advisors he inherited from Putin, and his own economic team, who take pragmatic positions free from ideology and old stereotypes.
Medvedev is quite consistent in his economic and domestic policy statements, but his foreign policy rhetoric fluctuates a great deal. Most of the American foreign policy establishment agrees that Medvedev is not a liberal in the Western sense of the term.
But he could turn out to be more of a foreign policy realist than many expect: capable of moving past the August 2008 events and starting to shape a foreign policy line of his own, rather than continuing to fight Putin's wars, which he had nothing to do with.
In any event, it's time to ask a question to which everyone had seemed to know the answer already: Who is Mr. Medvedev?
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| Source: "Vedomosti" |  |