23.02.09

Are the many changes President Dmitriy Medvedev made in the corps of governors on Monday an indication that he intends to start working in earnest on the creation of his own team of regional leaders? Does Medvedev have a personnel reserve that is not the same as Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's reserve? Vremya Novostey correspondent Natalya Rozhkova asked members of the expert community these questions.

"Medvedev Has To Start Dismantling the Inflexible Vertical Chain of Command"

Dmitriy Oreshkin, Independent Political Analyst:

It seems to me that Dmitriy Medvedev is mastering the exercise of the prerogatives he has in his capacity as the head of state. The governors are his business. He spent the first half of the year observing, and now he is gradually starting to take action. He is beginning to form a team, not necessarily his team, but a younger and, we can only hope, a more effective team. Putin's vertical chain of command operated by means of buying corrupt loyalty: We will allow you to do whatever you want in your region and you must give us political loyalty in exchange. This centripetal model presupposes that the governor will promote the policy line of the central leadership. This is secured by depriving him of any resources of his own, so he will be weaker and more dependent and will have to live on federal subsidies. The state of crisis is creating a situation in which the superiors also have no money, and Moscow cannot give everyone subsidies. In the interest of economic effectiveness, the center will have to delegate part of its powers to local officials. As a pragmatic economist, Medvedev apparently knows or senses that the regions have to be given more freedom. He will have to start dismantling the inflexible vertical chain of command. God knows how far these decisions will go, but the very fact that the president realizes people have to be replaced is a positive sign. It means he sees that the system is going off the rails.

Furthermore, this is his own policy. It is different from the policy of Putin, who wanted to perpetuate this situation for the purpose of retaining political control. Medvedev would rather avoid a conflict with Putin and avoid changing Putin's policy, but he is a pragmatic manager and he realizes that something has to be done if a good region with good economic potential is not making enough money.

"In a Certain Sense, the Governors Just Came in Handy"

Mikhail Vinogradov, President of St. Petersburg Policy Foundation:

That decision was made for several reasons. It was important for Dmitriy Medvedev to prove that his Vesti Nedeli interview was not just a conversation about general topics and that the words would be followed by concrete steps. In a certain sense, the governors just came in handy, especially in view of the fact that most of the dismissed regional leaders had been slated for retirement long ago, so this was more likely an excuse than a reason, and it had no direct connection to the crisis. In other words, the president made a bid for participation in forming the corps of governors, and it was not the first time he had done this. He did not state the priorities of his policy, however. Furthermore, there was the same old problem of the personnel reserve. The earlier rule, according to which the personnel reserve consisted of people who had worked or gone to school with Vladimir Putin long ago, is no longer in effect because most of Medvedev's friends were invited to Moscow earlier by Putin. I think Medvedev built some new relationships while he was working in the government, and more recently in the president's office. We have not seen any clear signs that he has new favorites whose names we did not know a year ago, however. As for his new appointees, Turchak (Andrey Turchak, the coordinator of the United Russia Young Guard, has been nominated for the governor's office in Pskov Oblast -- Ed.) probably cannot be called one of Medvedev's own choices. I think an important role in forming the new team will be played by the Presidential Staff, and by Chief of Staff Sergey Naryshkin to some extent.

"Putin Would Have Done Exactly the Same Thing"

Iosif Diskin, Co-Chairman of National Strategy Council:

The crisis is such an excellent diagnostician. It clearly separated those who could cope from those who could not. Current legislation assigns these decisions to Medvedev, but I think Putin would haved one exactly the same thing if he had been in this situation. Now Medvedev is conducting his own policy in the regions, and it would be strange for him to call Putin and ask: "Vladimir Vladimirovich, do you have any objections?" The changes in the corps of governors were not surprising. For a long time, they had been persuaded to leave office, first by Putin and then by Medvedev, but there ultimately was a realization that persuasion would not work and government authority would have to be wielded -- so it was wielded. Yesterday Mr. Medvedev also published a list of 100 people from the personnel reserve, and he has already sent one to the governor's office -- just as he had promised, his actions agreed with his words. There are no separate Putin and Medvedev teams here. This is a Russian government team. You must remember, for instance, that Medvedev was the first deputy prime minister and he also was working on a social program for rural areas. In other words, he has crossed paths with Aleksey Gordeyev (the former minister of agriculture who was sent to serve as the governor of Voronezh Oblast -- Ed.) and they know each other well.

"This Is Not a Matter of Forming a Medvedev Team"

Aleksey Makarkin, Deputy General Director of Political Technologies Center:

The gubernatorial appointments are so varied, and I would not say this is a matter of forming a Medvedev team. Medvedev has made unexpected appointments in the past month, when Ingushetia acquired President Yevkurov and when Ebzeyev took office in Karachayevo-Cherkessia, but the one generating the most publicity was the appointment of Nikita Belykh to the governor's office in Kirov Oblast. These were attempts to find new sources of replacements for the corps of governors, but I do not think the last four appointments had any common features that were distinctly part of a Medvedev policy. The replacements came from the traditional sources: two from the federal government staff, a minister and his deputy, and one from United Russia-- Turchak in Pskov (incidentally, this is the second Medvedev-appointed governor clearly representing United Russia; the first was Zimin in Khakassia), and the fourth was a manager in the power-engineering sector, the former deputy governor of Arkhangelsk Oblast. These are different sources, but they are all traditional.

Besides this, all four of the dismissed governors had been unofficially blacklisted for a fairly long time. Only the manner of their dismissal was in question. I think their replacements were also chosen before this year and only required final approval. The crisis led to a situation in which they were all dismissed at the same time, to prove that the federal government is exacting.

This probably is a continuation of the earlier personnel policy. After all, a revolutionary change in the plans for the appointment of governors would be impossible. Medvedev is testing the policy and conducting experiments even in regions where the situation is not completely hopeless -- in Kirov Oblast, for example. As for the creation of his own team, there is the personnel reserve -- the "hundred" posted on the kremlin.ru site. Those are people of Medvedev's generation, people who would have been called "liberal bureaucrats" in the 1960s. They could be promoted soon.

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Source: “Vremya Novostey”